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T

his study investigates the quality of direct probability judgments and quantile estimates with a focus on
calibration and consistency. The two response modes use different measures of miscalibration, so it is difﬁcult to directly compare their relative (in)accuracy. We employed a more reﬁned within-subject design in which
decision makers (DMs) used both response modes to make judgments about a random sample of stocks accompanied by identical information to facilitate comparison between the two judgment methods. DMs judged the
probabilities that the stocks will reach a certain threshold, provided lower and upper bounds of these forecasts, and estimated median, 50%, 70%, and 90% conﬁdence intervals of their future prices. We found that the
judgments were internally consistent and coherent, but in most cases they were slightly miscalibrated. We used
several new methods of analysis that allow for more precise and reliable comparison between the two response
modes. We inferred point probability estimates for the target events from the conﬁdence intervals and analyzed
them by the same methods applied to binary judgments. Interestingly, when we quantiﬁed miscalibration in
identical fashion for both methods we did not ﬁnd evidence of differential levels of miscalibration for the probability judgments and the conﬁdence intervals. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these
results.
Key words: overconﬁdence; calibration; conﬁdence intervals; probability judgments; response modes;
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1.

Introduction

trend of future price based on past price information.
When the investors forecasted future prices via conﬁdence intervals they were overconﬁdent, but underconﬁdence was observed when they estimated the
probability for the price trend. Simultaneous overand underconﬁdence was also observed by Kirchler
and Maciejovsky (2002) in an experimental market
setting: Depending on how conﬁdence was measured,
some participants could be classiﬁed as either overor underconﬁdent. The differential degree of overconﬁdence elicited by these two methods highlights the
difﬁculty of properly assessing judgment quality.
Given the limitations of human attention, memory,
and information-processing capacity, it is not surprising that investors’ subjective probabilities are often
poorly calibrated (Kahneman et al. 1982, Gilovich
et al. 2002). Empirical studies documented a general, but not universal, pattern of overconﬁdence,
and showed that the degree of overconﬁdence often
depends on the speciﬁc response mode used to elicit
subjective probabilities. The literature documents
substantial overconﬁdence in estimates of quantiles
(inferred from X% conﬁdence intervals), but lower (or,
occasionally, no) overconﬁdence when people provide

Investing in the stock market is a prototypical case
of decision under uncertainty. Investment decisions
often rely on probabilistic judgments about future
outcomes, and investors are often described as overconﬁdent (Daniel et al. 1998, 2001; De Bondt and
Thaler 1995). In the ﬁnance literature overconﬁdence
has been associated with real economic consequences
of stock return volatility and ﬁnancial losses (Barberis
and Thaler 2003). Overconﬁdence manifests itself in
several ways: Investors may hold unrealistic beliefs
about how high their returns will be, or overestimate
the precision of their private information and provide
too-tight conﬁdence intervals for the future value of
stocks (Barberis and Thaler 2003). Extensive empirical
evidence shows that overconﬁdent investors take too
many risks, trade too much to their detriment, and
earn lower average returns (Barber and Odean 2000,
2002). The quality of investors’ probabilistic judgments, therefore, inﬂuences their choices and affects
their investment outcomes.
Recent experimental evidence demonstrates that investors are not uniformly overconﬁdent. Glaser et al.
(2003) instructed two groups of investors to predict
1731
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direct probability estimates of binary events (Juslin
et al. 1999, 2000; Klayman et al. 1999; Lichtenstein
et al. 1982). These two estimation methods have
important analogues in the investment setting. For
example, investors may decide to buy (or sell) a particular stock only if the probability of the stock price
exceeding (falling short of) a certain threshold is X%,
i.e., depending on a probability judgment of a binary
event. Sometimes, investors rely on a “margin of
error” strategy—they buy (or sell) a stock when the
price is within a Y% conﬁdence interval.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the quality of conﬁdence judgments regarding
future prices of ﬁnancial assets in a variety of related
tasks. This is done in two within-subjects experiments involving a random sample of publicly traded
ﬁrms. Our results allow us to compare the quality of estimates obtained from the various elicitation
methods by focusing on two important features of
judgment quality—calibration and consistency—and
to shed new light on the underlying sources of the
miscalibration typically found in these judgments.
1.1.

Different Elicitation Methods and
Miscalibration
Extensive research has focused primarily on one
facet of judgment quality, calibration—the match between subjective probabilities with the corresponding fraction of actual realizations of the target events
(e.g., Budescu et al. 1997b, Gigerenzer et al. 1991,
Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977, Lichtenstein et al.
1982, Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Yates 1990).
These studies show that people are systematically
overconﬁdent about the accuracy of their knowledge
and judgments, because their subjective probabilities
are frequently more extreme than corresponding accuracy rates. For example, when people express 95%
conﬁdence, they may be correct only about 80% of
the time. These studies also ﬁnd that the amount of
overconﬁdence depends on the difﬁculty of the task.
The so-called “hard-easy” effect implies that overconﬁdence is higher in hard tasks, but attenuated,
or even eliminated, in easy tasks (e.g., Lichtenstein
and Fischhoff 1977, Lichtenstein et al. 1982, Keren
1991), although recently the reality of this effect was
questioned (Juslin et al. 2000). Calibration studies use
two types of response modes: estimation of quantiles (sometimes refereed to as fractiles) of probability
functions of continuous variables, and probabilistic
judgments about discrete propositions (Keren 1991).
Estimates of the quantiles of probability distributions are used for uncertain continuous quantities.
Judges are required to provide intervals (values) that
correspond to prestated probabilities (Juslin et al.
1999, Keren 1991). Over- or underconﬁdence is measured by the rate of surprises, i.e., the percentage
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of true values falling outside the conﬁdence intervals. For example, consider an investor who is asked
to provide 90% conﬁdence intervals for a variety of
stocks at the end of the year. If the investor is perfectly calibrated, 90% of bounds he or she provided
should include the actual values (and 10% of the values should fall outside the stated intervals). If the
percentage of surprises is higher than 10%, and the
proportion of values in the intervals is lower than
the prestated probability (e.g., only 40% of true values fall within the 90% intervals), it is inferred that
the judge is overconﬁdent. Conversely, underconﬁdence is inferred when the proportion of true values
in the interval is higher than the prestated probability.
The common ﬁnding is that the empirical intervals
are far too narrow. Hit rates in many studies using
90%–99% conﬁdence intervals are less than 50%, leading to surprise rates of 50% or higher instead of the
1%–10% expected from well-calibrated judges (Alpert
and Raiffa 1982, Klayman et al. 1999, Lichtenstein
et al. 1982, Seaver et al. 1978).
Direct probability estimates of binary events use
the full-range or the half-range assessment method.
In the former, judges are asked to assess the probability that various statements are true (or that certain
events will occur) on a scale ranging from zero (certainly false) to one (certainly true). For example, one
could ask investors to estimate the probability that
the stock price for Google will be higher than $60
at the end of the year (and other similar questions
about other stocks). In a half-range task people ﬁrst
decide whether a statement is true, and then assign a
probability to this decision. For example, when asked
if the price of Google will exceed $60 per share at
the end of the year, they need to agree or disagree
with the statement and assess the probability that
this choice is correct, using a scale from 0.5 (random
choice) and 1 (certainly true). Judges are considered
well calibrated if the relative frequencies of true statements match the stated probabilities (e.g., 90% of all
events assigned probability 0.9 should be correct). The
calibration curve plots the proportion of true (correct) items as a function of the judges’ probabilities.
The 45-degree line represents perfect calibration, and
points below (above) this line reﬂect over- (under-)
conﬁdence (Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977). The
Brier score and its two components—calibration (or
reliability) and resolution—provide quantitative measures of the quality of these judgments (Brier 1950;
Murphy 1973; Yates 1982, 1990). Most studies ﬁnd
overconﬁdence (e.g., Lichtenstein et al. 1982), but conservatism (underconﬁdence) was also observed (e.g.,
Edwards 1968, Erev et al. 1994).
Winman et al. (2004) suggested that probability estimates and conﬁdence intervals are formally equivalent because high (low) uncertainties can be expressed
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either by low (high) probability judgments or by wide
(narrow) interval estimates. Empirically, however, different elicitation methods have produced systematically different judgments (Rottenstreich and Tversky
1997). Although both methods tend to ﬁnd miscalibration, prior studies suggest that the direct probability
judgments induce only a modest bias as compared to
the fractile method (e.g., Klayman et al. 1999, Juslin
et al. 2000). For example, Klayman et al. (1999) documented less than 5% overconﬁdence on average
when decision makers (DMs) estimated probabilities
directly, but documented 45% overconﬁdence (in 90%
conﬁdence interval) when DMs answered conﬁdencerange questions with the fractile method. Some studies using direct probability judgments found modest
underconﬁdence (Erev et al. 1994). Juslin et al. (1999)
referred to the pattern of extreme overconﬁdence
with the fractile estimates and the better calibration
with the probability estimates as format dependence.
Two main classes of explanations have been offered
for overconﬁdence. These assume either (a) biases in
various stages of information processing, or (b) effects
of unbiased judgmental error (Soll 1996). Earlier
research attributed overconﬁdence to cognitive biases
in information processing and theorized that overconﬁdence results from biased retrieval and interpretation of evidence (e.g., Hoch 1985, Klayman et al. 1999,
Koriat et al. 1980). Other researchers argued that overconﬁdence is related to unsystematic imperfections
in judgment (Budescu et al. 1997a, Erev et al. 1994)
because random factors are involved in all stages of
the response process, i.e., when people learn the predictive validity of different sources of information
(Gigerenzer et al. 1991, Soll 1996), evaluate the available information, and map their subjective feelings of
conﬁdence to numerical responses (Erev et al. 1994).1
Both errors and biases have been invoked to
explain the differential degree of miscalibration associated with different response modes—direct probability estimates and fractile estimates. Winman et al.
(2004) attributed format dependence to the naïve
use of samples to estimate population properties—
speciﬁcally, people’s tendency to estimate conﬁdence
intervals from the sample dispersion they experience,
and to estimate probabilities from the sample proportion. Unlike a sample proportion, the sample variance is a biased estimator of population parameter.
1
Some researchers suggested, correctly in our opinion, that overconﬁdence is, at least in part, an experimentally induced artifact
as experimenters often choose harder-than-normal and unrepresentative items (Gigerenzer et al. 1991, Juslin 1994). In this study
DMs made judgments regarding future stock prices of real companies that were selected at random. This natural task and the
random selection circumvent the problem of unrepresentative sampling often encountered in studies using general knowledge questions selected by the experimenters.
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The failure to correct and adjust for the bias produces too-tight intervals that yield overconﬁdence
(Winman et al. 2004). Alternative explanations of this
intriguing pattern focus on two biases in the judgment process—anchoring-and-adjustment and conﬁrmation. According to the anchoring-and-adjustment
heuristic, judges start with their single best guess of
the quantity (the anchor), and then adjust their estimates. Because their adjustments are insufﬁcient, in
general, their interval estimates are too tight (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). Others proposed conﬁrmation
bias as a potential source of extreme overconﬁdence
(Klayman et al. 1999, Soll and Klayman 2004). Because
the fractile method offers no explicit alternative, people are more likely to form an initial impression
of quantity estimates and subsequently retrieve and
interpret evidence that conﬁrms these initial estimates
(Klayman 1995). Soll and Klayman (2004) argued that,
similar to the process of conﬁrming an initial hypothesis, interval estimates tend to be treated as a single
(fuzzy) judgment, and the single search of the relevant information creates a narrow range that is often
too tight. On the other hand, the response mode of
direct probability judgment (half range) offers two
explicit alternatives (e.g., the stock is higher, or lower,
than a threshold) and encourages people to engage
in two separate information searches, one below and
one above the given value. According to this explanation, miscalibration of direct probability judgments is
more likely to result from random errors rather than
cognitive biases.
1.2. The Present Study
The standard ﬁnding in the judgment literature (and
the generalization that permeates the general literature) is that people’s probability judgments are overconﬁdent. However, as discussed in the previous
section, overconﬁdence is far from uniform and universal. In particular, it seems to vary dramatically
across elicitation methods. The ﬁrst, and primary, goal
of this study is to directly compare the quality of
the judgments obtained from the two methods. There
is relatively little work about this important issue,
and those few studies comparing them suffer from
some glaring deﬁciencies: (a) they rely almost exclusively on between-subjects comparisons; (b) they do
not necessarily use the same items and events; (c) they
focus on very general patterns (do judges appear
over- or underconﬁdent under both methods?), but
do not compare them in a precise manner. In fact,
(d) the two methods use different measures of miscalibration and, at this time, there is no good way
to compare, directly and accurately, the accuracy of
judgments resulting from the use of the two methods.
Thus, it is difﬁcult to determine if the observed differences merely reﬂect different levels of suboptimality,
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or deeper qualitative differences, and it is impossible to tell whether these discrepancies reﬂect variability induced by the elicitation methods, the events, or
the respondent populations and their differential levels of knowledge and information. The present study
seeks to remedy some of these deﬁciencies and generate data that would allow direct and uncontaminated
comparisons between the two methods.
We report results from two experiments. DMs made
a series of judgments regarding future stock prices
after observing past price performances. Unlike prior
studies, which relied on between-subjects designs
(Juslin et al. 1999, Klayman et al. 1999, Soll and
Klayman 2004), we used a within-subjects design
where DMs made six judgments after seeing the same
information about 40 real companies. The items used
are sampled from a broader universe of relevant
events so that they represent an ecologically valid
sample, and they are presented to the judges in a fashion that equates the level of relevant information for
all participants in all cases. The DMs estimated (a)
the probability that the future price will exceed $20
and (b) the lower and upper bounds (i.e., an interval
estimate) of this probability. Although such intervals
were rarely used in the context of calibration research,
they are quite a common way to model decisions with
vague and imprecise information (Budescu et al. 2002,
Du and Budescu 2005, Kuhn and Budescu 1996). DMs
were also asked to provide (c) 50%, (d) 70%, (e) 90%
conﬁdence intervals, and (f) the median price. The
second experiment is an extended replication of the
ﬁrst, where we controlled for order effects and introduced more diverse events for probability predictions.
Conﬁdence intervals generated through (implicit)
fractile estimates are too narrow (implying large levels of overconﬁdence), but these studies tend to
use only one conﬁdence level. Typically, the focus
is on 90% intervals (see, for example, Russo and
Schoemaker 1992), or higher conﬁdence levels (e.g.,
95%). It is not clear whether people are equally, or
even consistently, overconﬁdent across all conﬁdence
levels (e.g., Soll et al. 1999, Teigen and Jørgensen
2005). A second goal of our study is to address this
issue by eliciting multiple conﬁdence intervals (i.e.,
with various conﬁdence levels) for the same events
from our respondents. This will enable tests of the
generality of the overconﬁdence tendency, as well as
new tests of coherence and internal consistency. This
will be achieved by comparing the conﬁdence intervals corresponding to three (50%, 70%, and 90%) conﬁdence levels. Given our interest in both methods, we
will also study the consistency of the direct probability estimates by comparing precise (point) probability judgments to vague probability judgments. Finally,
we will develop new analysis techniques to study,
for the ﬁrst time, the consistency of the two sets of
estimates.
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2.

Experiment 1

2.1. Experimental Method
Sixty-three graduate accounting students (31 women
and 32 men) were recruited in the Business School
of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
They were all familiar with the basic concepts of
ﬁnance and investment. The participants were asked
to assume the role of an investor and provide forecasts for 40 different stocks, randomly selected from
a database that tracks stock prices of publicly traded
companies. For each stock we presented monthly
price series for the 12 months of Year 1. The stocks
were not identiﬁed by name. We asked DMs to carefully examine each plot and make judgments and
predictions regarding prices at the end of Month 3
for Year 2. Figure 1 presents an example of such a
price plot. We ran three small groups in class settings
involving 30, 16, and 17 DMs. The experiment consisted of two tasks (see details below). The order of
the two tasks was randomized in each session. After a
brief verbal explanation of the tasks, DMs were given
ﬁve minutes to read the general instructions. Then
we projected the price plots on the screen, one at a
time, in random order. DMs wrote down their judgments after each price plot was shown. On average,
DMs required 60 minutes to complete the experiment.
To motivate the participants we scored their performance according to its accuracy. The scores were calculated by comparing participants’ predictions to the
true prices for each stock. All DMs were entered in
lotteries for cash prizes of $50. Their chances of winning were proportional to their accuracy scores. Lottery drawings were conducted one week after the
experimental session. Four participants were awarded
cash prizes.
All participants performed two tasks consisting
of six types of judgments. For each judgment we
presented the same 40 price plots, but in different random orders. The ﬁrst task was of probability judgments that required two responses—the best estimate
and an interval (range) estimate. The instructions
read: “Please indicate how probable it is that the price
of each stock will exceed $20 at the end of Month 3
of Year 2. You must give your best estimate of this
Figure 1

Price ($)
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probability (lower and upper bounds of this probability).” The second task asked for estimates of quantiles. The instructions read: “Please estimate the future
price for each stock at the end of Month 3 for Year 2.
We are interested in a range of possible prices that
makes you 50% (or 70% or 90%) sure. When you are
50% (or 70% or 90%) sure, you should expect 50% (or
70% or 90%) of the correct answers to lie somewhere
between the upper and lower bounds you speciﬁed.
In other words, you should provide numbers such
that, in your opinion, there is a 50% (or 70% or 90%)
chance that the interval includes the correct price, and
there is only a 25% (or 15% or 5%) chance that the
price will be higher than the upper bound, and a 25%
(or 15% or 5%) chance that it will be lower than the
lower bound.” For the median price, we asked participants to provide a single number that they believe is
equally likely that the price will be below or above it.
2.2. Results
We ﬁrst report results for the probability judgment
task, followed by the quantile estimation task, and,
ﬁnally, results involving both tasks. Within each section we ﬁrst discuss calibration and then consistency.
There were no differences between the two presentation orders, so we present the results of the total
sample.
2.2.1. The Probability Judgment Task.
Calibration. DMs estimated the probability that the
price will exceed $20, as well as lower and upper
bounds of this probability. We also computed the
midrange of this interval, so we have four quantities for each of the 2,520 probability judgments
(40 stocks × 63 participants). We grouped these
judgments into 13 categories: 0.00 alone, 0.01–0.09,
0.10–0.19, 0.20–0.29, 0.30–0.39, 0.40–0.49, 0.50 alone,
0.51–0.59, 0.61–0.69, 0.71–0.79, 0.81–0.89, 0.90–0.99,
and 1.00 alone (this coding scheme ensures that the
three anchor values—0, 0.5, 1—do not bias the other
categories), and we counted the relative frequencies
of stocks with prices above $20 in each category.
Table 1 shows the distribution for the point estimates.
Table 1

The row labeled “subjective probability” is the average judgment provided by the participants across all
items in that category. The modal category was 0.5
(351 responses), and the distribution skews slightly
towards the left. This is not surprising, given that
35% of the 40 stocks have true prices above $20.
In the lower part of the table, we also present the
mean subjective estimates of the lower and upper
bounds and the midrange corresponding to the 13 categories. Table 1 indicates that the best estimates, the
midranges, and the upper bounds are all higher than
the percentage true.
We constructed calibration plots of the relative frequencies of the events, as a function of the mean
subjective probabilities for each of the 13 categories.
The calibration analysis was performed in four different ways by assigning items to one of the 13 categories based on the best estimate (see Table 1), the
lower bound, the upper bound, and the midrange.
Figure 2 shows the calibration plots for each of these
four groups, along with the Brier score and its two
components of calibration and resolution (Brier 1950,
1982). In the best-estimate plot, the subjective probabilities are higher than the observed relative frequencies, indicating a pattern of overconﬁdence, except for
slight underconﬁdence in the 0 and 0.60–0.69 categories. The calibration plots for the midrange and the
upper bound also indicated overconﬁdence, and the
plot based on the lower bound is the most accurate
one. The Brier scores do not differ too much from
each other, varying from 0.15 to 0.19. Apparently, all
four tasks achieve the same level of resolution (0.15),
but judgments in the lower-bound category have the
lowest (best) calibration score.
Consistency. The ﬁrst consistency analysis considers proper inclusion: If judgments are consistent, the
best estimate should fall within the range deﬁned
by the upper and lower bounds, i.e., we expect
lower ≤ best ≤ higher. We found that the majority
of judgments—1,657 out of 2,520 (66%)—satisfy this
inequality. Violations of proper inclusion are symmetrically distributed—16% of cases have the best
estimate lower than the lower bound, whereas 18% of

Distribution of Probability Estimates and Their Bounds (Experiment 1)

Categories
Subjective probability
Percentage true—
best estimate
Frequency
Subjective probability—
lower bound
Subjective probability—
upper bound
Subjective probability—
midrange

0

0.01–0.09 0.1–0.19 0.2–0.29 0.3–0.39 0.4–0.49 0.5 0.51–0.59 0.60–0.69 0.70–0.79 0.80–0.89 0.90–0.99

1

0.00
0.03

0.04
0.00

0.12
0.05

0.22
0.08

0.32
0.16

0.42
0.31

0.50
0.44

0.55
0.50

0.62
0.63

0.72
0.62

0.82
0.72

0.92
0.82

1.00
0.86

145
0.05

239
0.09

260
0.12

209
0.18

183
0.26

265
0.33

351
0.37

119
0.41

232
0.46

188
0.48

146
0.52

133
0.63

50
0.65

0.19

0.24

0.32

0.39

0.49

0.56

0.61

0.63

0.68

0.71

0.75

0.82

0.87

0.12

0.16

0.22

0.28

0.38

0.45

0.49

0.52

0.57

0.6

0.64

0.73

0.76
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Calibration Plots (Experiment 1)
1.0

Percentage true

1.0
0.9

Best estimate

0.9

Midrange

0.8

(Calibration = 0.01,
resolution = 0.15,
Brier score = 0.16)

0.8

(Calibration = 0.02,
resolution = 0.15,
Brier score = 0.17)

0.7
0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0
0.0

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00

0.0
0.0

0.9

Lower bound

0.9

0.8

(Calibration = 0.00,
resolution = 0.15,
Brier score = 0.15)

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0
0.0

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00

1.0

1.0

Percentage true

0.7

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00

0.0
0.0

Subjective probability

cases have the best estimate higher than the upper
bound. The consistency rate increases markedly (to
75%) when we use removed judgments related to the
ﬁve stocks and the nine participants with the highest rates of violations. We analyzed the consistency
rate at the individual level by calculating the mean of
each subject’s judgments across all 40 stocks. Only 6
out of 63 participants violated this inequality at the
aggregate level, yielding a consistency rate of 95%.
We compared the best, the lower, and the upper
probability judgments in a one-factor repeatedmeasures ANOVA. The means of these three estimates
are signiﬁcantly different (F2124 = 20140 p < 001).
The mean of the best estimates is bounded by the
means of the lower and upper bounds, as expected.
The midrange of the vague interval judgment (i.e.,
(lower bound + upper bound)/2) is 0.42, and matches
the best estimate. Thus, the precise and the vague
judgments elicited by the direct probability estimate
are highly consistent.
Lastly, we correlated the mean estimates of the best,
the lower bound, the upper bound, and the midrange
for each of the 40 stocks (across 63 participants). All
correlations are higher than 0.90 and signiﬁcant. We
also correlated these measures with the mean width
of the range. These correlations are also positive
(between 0.38 and 0.41) and signiﬁcant. The positive
relationship implies that participants injected higher
uncertainty into their judgments about stocks that

Upper bound
(Calibration = 0.04,
resolution = 0.15,
Brier score = 0.19)

0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00

Subjective probability

were judged more likely to exceed $20. Apparently,
participants hedge their higher-probability judgments
by widening the range.
2.2.2. The Quantile Estimates.
Calibration. Participants provided 50%, 70%, and
90% conﬁdence intervals. Judgments are considered
calibrated if the fraction of cases that were in fact
correct matches the interval’s stated conﬁdence. If
the conﬁdence is higher (lower) than the actual hit
rate, the DMs are said to be overconﬁdent (underconﬁdent). The empirical results (see Table 2) show
an interesting pattern of underconﬁdence at the 50%
level, perfect calibration at the 70% level, and overconﬁdence at the 90% level. Evidently, overconﬁdence
is not universal.
Consistency. DMs provided seven quantiles. If these
estimates are fully consistent, they should be ranked
accordingly (lower bounds of 90%, 70%, 50%, median,
upper bounds of 50%, 70%, and 90%). We calculated
the (Kendall) rank-order correlations between these
seven estimates and their expected order (it should
Table 2

Calibration of Conﬁdence Intervals (CIs) (Experiment 1)

Percentage of prices in the interval (hits)
Expected percentage of prices in the interval
Over/underconﬁdence (surprises)

50% CI

70% CI

90% CI

059
050
−009

0.70
0.70
0.00

0.82
0.90
0.08
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be one for perfectly consistent ratings). For each subject, we calculated the means of the seven estimates
across all 40 stocks and used these in the calculations. This generated a distribution of 63 individual
DM correlations. Kendall’s b indicates that DMs are
highly consistent: The mean correlation is 0.90 (only
one correlation is lower than 0.50) and 62 of the
63 correlations are signiﬁcantly greater than 0 (p <
005). For each stock, we also calculated the means
of these seven estimates across all 63 DMs. This generates a distribution of 40 individual stock correlations. Kendall’s b indicate that price estimates are
highly consistent. For 39 stocks, the seven estimates
and the expected order are perfectly (ordinally) correlated. Only one stock has a less than perfect correlation coefﬁcient (0.91).
Next, we conducted a two-factor repeated measures
ANOVA of the bounds of the conﬁdence intervals.
The ﬁrst factor is the nature of the bound (lower or
upper) of the interval, and the second factor is the
interval’s level of conﬁdence. Naturally, the upper
bounds are higher than the lower bounds (F162 =
42342 p < 001), and there is a signiﬁcant effect of
conﬁdence level (F2124 = 980 p < 001). As expected,
we found a signiﬁcant interaction, reﬂected in a fanning out pattern (F2124 = 8077 p < 001) depicted in
Figure 3. The line of the midrange is almost straight
(it was not included in the analysis, but it is plotted to facilitate interpretation), and bracketed by the
lower and the upper estimates. The mean of the
median estimates is 18.69 (with a minimum of 17.23,
a maximum of 21.65, and a SD of 84), and closely
matches the midranges of the conﬁdence intervals. It
appears that the DMs’ conﬁdence intervals are internally consistent.
2.2.3. Comparing the Probability and the Fractile
Methods.
Calibration. If DMs’ judgments are consistent across
these two elicitation methods, they should exhibit
similar patterns of over- or underconﬁdence. We used
a (new, to the best of our knowledge) matching procedure to compare the two sets of judgments by
mapping the results from the fractile method to the

Price estimates ($)

Figure 3
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10

Mean Bounds of Different Conﬁdence Intervals
(Experiment 1)
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probability method. We used the seven judged quantiles (Q05, Q15, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q85, and Q95) to
estimate the means and standard deviations of the
best-ﬁtting normal distribution for each of the 2,520
cases (63 DMs × 40 stocks).2 These distributions were
used to calculate the z scores corresponding to the
target price ($20), and the expected probability of the
stock being above it. We grouped these 2,520 predicted probabilities into the 13 categories used in §3.1.
Table 3 shows the distribution of expected probabilities. Remarkably, we see a very similar pattern when
we plot the calibration for predicted probabilities (see
Panel B in Figure 4) next to the judged probabilities
(Panel A in Figure 4, the same as the best estimate
in Figure 2). Both plots show a predominant pattern
of overconﬁdence and almost identical measures of
calibration and resolution.
This analysis demonstrates that when judgments
elicited by the two methods are evaluated by similar
measures they are highly consistent. Moreover, when
we used the probability function implied by the quantile estimates to predict the lower and upper bounds
of 50%, 70%, and 90% conﬁdence intervals, we found
that these predicted values are better calibrated than
the empirical data. Speciﬁcally, 55%, 71%, and 87% of
the true prices fall within the predicted (50%, 70%,
and 90%, respectively) conﬁdence intervals (compare
with the values from Table 2).
Consistency. First, we test whether the direct probabilities associated with the target event (price ≥$20)
are consistent with the boundaries of the intervals in
which $20 is located. We inspected each judgment set
and determined the location of the target price ($20).
For example, if the value of $20 falls between Q15
and Q25, we expect (1 − 025 = 075 < P X > 20 <
1 − 015 = 085 to hold. The expected pattern was
found in 1,662 out of the 2,520 cases yielding a 66%
consistency rate. The observed violations are almost
symmetrically distributed, and the consistency rate
increases to 70% when we exclude the nine DMs with
the worst performance.
Finally, we compared the probabilities predicted
from the fractile method (using the approximations
described earlier in this section) with the actual
probability judgments. We calculated the difference
between the judged and predicted probabilities, and

26.19

Upper
22.56
Mid 18.75
14.94

23.56

18.67

13.79
11.96

Lower

CI 50%

2

18.69
19.07 (Best
estimate)

CI 70%

CI 90%

To ﬁt a normal distribution to these estimates, we use the Z values
under a normal distribution corresponding to the seven estimates.
By deﬁnition: Z = (Price − Mean)/SD. We rearrange terms and get
Price = Mean + SD ∗ Z. We regressed the judged prices on the seven
Z values, so the intercept estimates the mean price of the stock
and the slope estimates the SD of the distribution. The expected
probability is obtained by calculating the z score corresponding to
each stock and subject, and is subsequently determined by using
the normal table.
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Table 3

Distribution of Predicted Probability Judgments (Experiment 1)

Categories

0

0.01–0.09 0.1–0.19 0.2–0.29 0.3–0.39 0.4–0.49 0.5 0.51–0.59 0.60–0.69 0.70–0.79 0.80–0.89 0.90–0.99

Subjective probability— 0.00
best estimate
Percentage true
0.01
Frequency
239

1

0.05

0.15

0.25

0.36

0.45

0.50

0.56

0.65

0.75

0.86

0.96

1.00

0.00
407

0.03
223

0.06
156

0.24
138

0.45
155

0.44
45

0.47
256

0.50
259

0.64
192

0.66
144

0.86
222

0.98
84

conducted t-tests to see whether their means are different from zero for each subject across these 40
stocks. Within-subject consistency across methods is
very high: t-tests found that only 9 persons out of
63 (14%) had mean differences signiﬁcantly different
from zero ( = 00008 using the Sidack adjustment).
Figure 5 presents the mean difference of these two
for the best estimate, the lower bound, and the upper
bound for each subject. The line for the best estimate
is mostly around zero, and is bracketed by the lower
and upper bounds.

a common metric (see Figure 4). One possible explanation is that because the subjects saw the same items
several times, they simply recalled some of their earlier judgments and tailored subsequent judgments
accordingly. A second study was conducted to replicate and validate the results of the ﬁrst experiment.
The second experiment uses new items, and more
events for probability predictions (not only $20). Also,
to refute the possibility that the remarkable level of
consistency between tasks observed in the ﬁrst experiment was due to the blocking of the tasks, we manipulated the order of tasks administered.

3.

3.1. Experimental Method
Seventy-ﬁve undergraduate business students (39
women and 36 men) from DePaul University participated in this experiment. The study was similar to the ﬁrst one in most respects, but differed
in some details: (a) For each stock, the participants
saw time series of the past 24 months (instead of 12
months) and were asked to make forecasts for stock
prices at the end of Month 3 of Year 3 (instead of
Month 3 of Year 2). (b) The experiment consisted
of two tasks—probability judgments and conﬁdence
intervals. The conﬁdence interval task was identical to
the ﬁrst study, but we only asked for the best-estimate
probability judgment (dropping the request for lower
and upper bounds). On the other hand, we asked
participants to judge three events: how probable it
is that the stock price will exceed $20, $30, and $40,
respectively. Thus, participants made seven different
judgments—50% conﬁdence interval (CI 50), 70% conﬁdence interval (CI 70), 90% conﬁdence interval (CI
90), median, probability for price $20, probability for
price $30, and probability for price $40. (c) We used
a different set of (randomly selected from the same
database) 40 stocks. (d) Most important, we ran four
small groups in class settings involving 19, 18, 20, and
18 DMs. For each group, we used a different order of
the seven tasks (see Table 4).
We instructed subjects to be as accurate as possible, and promised ﬁnancial rewards for accuracy. The
two subjects with the highest accuracy scores in each
group received $25 gift cards redeemable at the campus bookstore.

Experiment 2

The most surprising result of the ﬁrst study was the
high level of consistency between the two methods
when the results are analyzed by similar methods in
Figure 4

Comparison of Calibration Curves (Experiment 1)

Panel A: Probability judgments
1.0
(Calibration = 0.01,
resolution = 0.15,
Brier score = 0.16)

0.9

Percentage true

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

0.70

0.80

0.90 1.00

Subjective probability
Panel B: Predicted probability judgments
1.00
0.90

Percentage true

0.80

(Calibration = 0.01,
resolution = 0.13,
Brier score = 0.14)

0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
0.0

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

Subjective probability

3.2. Results
This section is structured as in the ﬁrst experiment,
but some details are omitted to save space.
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Figure 5

Mean Difference Between Probability Judgments and Predicted Probabilities (Experiment 1)
0.4

Upper bound

0.3
0.2

Best
estimate

0.1
0
– 0.1
– 0.2

Lower bound

– 0.3
– 0.4

Table 4

Task Order (Experiment 2)

Task order

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

CI 70
CI 50
CI 90
Median
Price 30
Price 20
Price 40

CI 90
CI 50
CI 70
Median
Price 40
Price 20
Price 30

Price 30
Price 20
Price 40
CI 70
CI 50
CI 90
Median

Price 40
Price 20
Price 30
CI 90
CI 50
CI 70
Median

N = 19

N = 18

N = 20

N = 18

3.2.3. Comparing the Probability and the Fractile Methods. First, we map the results from the fractile method to binary probabilities by estimating the
means and standard deviations of the best-ﬁtting normal distribution for each of the 3,000 cases (75 DMs ×
40 stocks). These distributions were used to calculate the z scores corresponding to the target price
Figure 6

Comparison of Calibration Curves (Experiment 2)

Panel A: Probability judgments
1.0

All prices

0.9

(Calibration = 0.02,
resolution = 0.12,
Brier score = 0.14)

0.8

Percentage true

3.2.2. The Quantile Estimates. The participants
provided a total of 9,000 conﬁdence intervals (40
stocks × 75 participants × 3 CIs). We conducted
a consistency analysis to determine whether the
seven quantiles were ranked appropriately. The mean
(Kendall’s b  correlation is 0.82 and 74 of 75 correlations are signiﬁcantly greater than zero (p < 005),
indicating that the DMs are highly consistent.

The results of the calibration analysis (see the top
row in Table 5) were very similar to the ﬁrst study:
underconﬁdence at the 50% level, good calibration at
the 70% level, and overconﬁdence at the 90%. The last
four rows in Table 5 indicate that these rates were
very similar for all four orders.

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Subjective probability
Panel B: Predicted probability judgments
1.0

Percentage true

3.2.1. The Probability Judgment Task. In this
task DMs estimated the probability that prices will
exceed $20, $30, and $40, so we have three quantities
for each of the 3 000 probability judgments (40 stocks
for 75 participants). If judgments are consistent, we
expect the probability judgments to be monotonically
increasing (i.e., P X ≥ 20 ≥ P X ≥ 30 ≥ P X ≥ 40).
Sixty-nine of the 75 participants (92%) made probability judgments satisfying this inequality, indicating
high levels of consistency.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the calibration plot
(based on 13 categories), as well as the Brier score
and its decomposition. The subjective probabilities are
lower than the observed relative frequencies, indicating a pattern of underconﬁdence. Detailed inspection
suggests this pattern is driven by the results for $20
and $30 price classes, whose true frequencies are 93%
and 80%, respectively, whereas the judgments for $40
were well calibrated. Figure 7 shows the calibration
plots of probability judgments for each group. The
calibration scores and the calibration plots are very
similar for all four groups. Therefore, we conclude
that the results were not driven by the different task
order.

0.9

All prices

0.8

(Calibration = 0.01,
resolution = 0.08,
Brier score = 0.09)
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0.6
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Figure 7

Calibration Plot by Each Group (Experiment 2)
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Rate of Surprises Overall and by Group
(Experiment 2)
50% CI

70% CI

−014
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($20, $30, and $40, respectively), and the probability
of the stock being above it. For a vast majority of the
subjects, the predicted probabilities were not signiﬁcantly different from the actual judged probabilities.
The calibration plot of the 9,000 predicted probabilities (see Panel B in Figure 6) is very similar to the one
based on the direct probability judgments (Panel A in
Figure 6). Both show a predominant pattern of underconﬁdence, and have almost identical measures of calibration and resolution.
Next, we tested whether the location of the direct
probabilities associated with the target event (price
≥$20, $30, or $40, respectively) are consistent with the
boundaries of the intervals in which $20, $30, or $40
is located (see the consistency analysis in §2.2.3). The
expected pattern was found in 4,815 out of the 8,966,
for a 54% consistency rate. If instead of the seven original quantiles we use only ﬁve (ignoring the 90% CI),
or three (ignoring the 90% and 70% CIs), the consistency rate increases to 62% and 68%, respectively.

All Groups
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4

0.1

Group 4

0.8

0.6

Table 5

0

0.9

(Calibration = 0.02,
resolution = 0.12,
Brier score = 0.14)

0.8

Percentage true

0

1.0

1.0

0

(Calibration = 0.02,
resolution = 0.12,
Brier score = 0.14)

0.8

0.6

0

Group 2

0.9

90% CI
0.12
0.20
0.09
0.14
0.06

In the present study subjects provided three probability judgments for every stock. We used these probabilities to estimate the means and standard deviations
of the best-ﬁtting normal distribution for each of the
3,000 cases (75 DMs × 40 stocks).3 Thus, we had two
independent sets of estimates of these parameters—
one based on the quantile estimates and one based
on the probability judgments. The ﬁnal analysis compared these distinct sets of estimates. First we compared the means of the distributions. We calculated
the mean difference for each subject across all the
stocks. The mean difference is −077, and it is not
signiﬁcantly different from 0 t70 = −124 p > 005.
We also calculated the mean difference for each
stock across all subjects, and obtained similar results
(Mean = −112 t39 = −149 p > 005). Thus, the quantile and probability judgments seem to reﬂect probability distributions with identical means.
Next we analyzed the ratio of the two standard
deviations. First we combined the ratios for each of
the subjects across all the stocks. The standard deviations inferred from the probability judgments are
higher (median within-subject ratio = 167). A test
based on the logarithms of these ratios indicates that
this difference is signiﬁcant t70 = 540 p < 005. We
3
Because we only have three points, it was not possible to obtain
meaningful estimates of the two parameters in almost 24% of the
cases. This includes cases with incomplete data, equal probabilities,
and inconsistent judgments.
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performed the same analysis based on within-stock
(across all subjects) ratios and obtained similar results
(Median ratio = 201 t39 = 1103 p < 005). The probability judgments seem to reﬂect probability distributions with higher variances.

4.

General Discussion

4.1. Summary of Major Findings
We studied the quality of direct probability judgments
and quantile estimates with a focus on calibration
and consistency. We employed a more reﬁned withinsubject design, in which DMs used both methods
to judge random samples of stocks accompanied by
identical information to facilitate comparison between
the two judgment methods. After observing past performance of a given stock, DMs estimated the probability that the future price will exceed a target price,
lower and upper bounds (i.e., an interval estimate) of
this probability, and various quantiles of the distribution of future prices.
We found strong evidence that judgments are
coherent and consistent within each method. For
direct probability estimates, most point estimates fell
within the range implied by the lower and upper
bounds. The DMs’ judgments of the quantiles were
sensitive to the degree of conﬁdence, in the sense that
they widened their range estimates according to the
conﬁdence level. This sensitivity of the interval estimates to the conﬁdence probability level is consistent with some prior ﬁndings (Alpert and Raiffa 1982,
Juslin et al. 1999, Seaver et al. 1978), but contradicts
some recent results. Jørgensen et al. (2004) and Teigen
and Jørgensen (2005) found that different groups of
subjects provided almost identical conﬁdence intervals for 50%, 75%, 90%, and 99% levels. Several factors can account for the different patterns of results,
but the most important is the nature of the design
and elicitation procedure. Sensitivity to the conﬁdence
levels was found only in studies employing withinsubjects designs (like the present one). When DMs
provide multiple conﬁdence intervals (e.g., 50%, 70%,
and 90%) they can adjust and tailor the widths of
conﬁdence intervals according to the whole sequence
of judgments. This pattern is not necessarily replicated in between-subjects designs (e.g., in Teigen
and Jørgensen 2005), where such direct comparisons
between various levels of conﬁdence are impossible.
Moreover, we found strong evidence that judgments are consistent across response modes because
most between-methods comparisons showed a high
level of agreement. The majority (66%) of the direct
probability judgments (see Experiment 1) fell within
the interval predicted by the inferred price distribution. Remarkably, the internal consistency of the direct
probability judgments (point probability within the
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range) was also 66%, indicating that the betweenmethods agreement was as high as one could reasonably expect given the inaccuracy of the methods. In
the same spirit, when we compared the probabilities
inferred from the conﬁdence intervals with the direct
probability judgments, we did not ﬁnd them to differ signiﬁcantly. In Experiment 2, we used a different
order of the judgment tasks in the various groups, yet
we replicated all the major results pertaining both to
within-method coherence and between-method consistency. This invariance indicates that the original
results were not due to the structure of the original
experiment.
Consistent with previous ﬁndings that DMs are typically miscalibrated, the direct probability estimates
of the binary events displayed modest overconﬁdence (Experiment 1) and underconﬁdence (Experiment 2), because the point probabilities did not
precisely match the relative frequencies of true events.
Judgments elicited by the fractile method showed
a more complex and intriguing pattern: too-wide
50% conﬁdence intervals, overly narrow 90% conﬁdence intervals, and perfectly calibrated 70% conﬁdence intervals, in both studies. Unlike prior studies,
where 90% conﬁdence intervals yielded very low hit
rates (in the 25%–40% range in Soll and Klayman
2004 and Teigen and Jørgensen 2005), hit rates in our
experiments are about 80%. We attribute part of the
differences to the nature of our stimuli. Many studies documenting extreme overconﬁdence used general
knowledge questions, where people had to rely on,
and sample from, their memory, and therefore were
more susceptible to cognitive biases (Kahneman et al.
1982, Klayman et al. 1999, Soll and Klayman 2004).
Conﬁdence judgments for general knowledge items
reﬂect internal uncertainty where DMs are uncertain about their level of knowledge. They induce
large individual differences due to differential levels
of information. In our study, DMs predicted future
events in the market where a good portion of the
uncertainty is due to external sources (ﬂuctuations of
the ﬁnancial market). In fact, Teigen and Jørgensen
(2005) have argued that interval estimates make less
sense for judgments that probe exclusively internal
uncertainty. An additional factor that explains the better quality of judgments in our study is the DMs’
access to relevant (past) predictors from which they
could infer the future. Prior studies in judgmental
forecasting document that serially correlated cues,
such as those in time series, tend to reduce the degree
of overconﬁdence when DMs estimate conﬁdence
intervals (Lawrence et al. 2006). The availability of
these cues allowed DMs to estimate reasonable conﬁdence intervals and considerably reduced (eliminated
in some cases) the level of overconﬁdence (Teigen and
Jørgensen 2005).
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The differential pattern found in the three conﬁdence intervals can be explained by the tradeoff between the two competing objectives—accuracy
and informativeness—that people consider when they
estimate uncertain quantities (Yaniv and Foster 1995).
Wider intervals are less informative, but are more
accurate (Yaniv and Foster 1995, 1997). The overreaching goal of the DMs in our study (and the incentive structure we provided) was to maximize the
rate of correct judgments, but it appears that this
was operationalized in different ways in the various tasks. When asked to provide 50% conﬁdence
interval, DMs chose to increase accuracy (i.e., hit
rates) by widening their estimated intervals, which
induced underconﬁdence. On the other hand, when
they were asked to provide 90% conﬁdence intervals the DMs deliberately avoided wider ranges to
ensure that their expressed estimates were sufﬁciently
informative, leading to the observed overconﬁdence.
The 70% conﬁdence intervals seem to be those where
most DMs achieved the best compromise between the
needs to be informative and to be accurate, i.e., one
that produced well-calibrated judgments. Regardless
of the validity of this interpretation, our results illustrate the pitfalls of generalizing about, supposedly,
global patterns (such as overconﬁdence) based on limited data (say, only 90% conﬁdence intervals).
The two response modes use different scales and
their standard analysis invokes different measures
of (mis)calibration. We developed several new approaches to achieve more precise and direct comparison between them. In the most direct and informative
comparison, we used the conﬁdence intervals to ﬁt a
distribution of future prizes, and predicted the probabilities of the target events (price greater than a given
$ threshold) from the ﬁtted distribution. The calibration analysis of these predicted probabilities yielded
results (calibration curves and Brier scores) that were
very similar to those from the direct probability estimates. In other words, when we used an approach
that quantiﬁes miscalibration in identical fashion for
both methods, we did not ﬁnd evidence of differential levels of miscalibration for direct probability judgments and conﬁdence intervals.
4.2. Implications of the Results
Our results conﬁrm some of the standard ﬁndings
in the probability judgment literature, but challenge
some of the generalizations regarding overconﬁdence
that permeate this literature and highlight the need to
study the quality of such judgments using multiple
elicitation methods. For direct probability estimates,
we found only slight miscalibration (overconﬁdence
in one study and underconﬁdence in the other).
This supports the view that when events/items are
selected at random from meaningful reference classes,
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DMs are quite accurate (Gigernezer et al. 1991, Juslin
1993), although not perfect (Budescu et al. 1997a). We
also replicated the standard, and often cited, ﬁnding of unrealistically narrow 90% conﬁdence intervals.
Unlike prior studies, we elicited intervals for three
different conﬁdence levels (50%, 70%, and 90%), and
found that they are not equally miscalibrated. In fact,
the 70% intervals are quite accurate.
The 90% conﬁdence intervals have become the standard tool for measuring calibration, but our ﬁndings
illustrate quite dramatically the danger of relying on
this single measure and extrapolating from it, and
infer global overconﬁdence. In fact, the choice of a
speciﬁc conﬁdence level should depend on the issues
and risks involved (Russo and Shoemaker 1992). For
example, if an investor plans to invest a large sum
of money in a small high-tech ﬁrm, where he/she
may face the risk of losing all his investment, the
DM may want to incorporate extreme swings in
stock prices, and assess a 90% (or higher) conﬁdence level on future prices. Lower conﬁdence levels (e.g., 50% or lower) are appropriate if an investor
faces minimal downside risks, but values high accuracy. We observed the least amount of bias when
DMs provided 70% intervals. Given this pattern, it
may be useful to adopt the use of the 70% intervals in most practical applications to obtain the most
accurate information from advisors. We cannot state
with conﬁdence that this pattern holds in all contexts
and domains, but our results suggest that it is relatively easy to identify those conﬁdence levels that
are most accurate (because they achieve the right balance between perceived accuracy and informativeness) for distinct domains. Finally, if one is interested
in obtaining a complete picture of the DMs’ performance, our study documents the beneﬁts of eliciting
multiple intervals involving various conﬁdence levels.
Our results are consistent with the growing body
of literature on format effects in judgment, and support the view that conﬁdence interval judgments
are sensitive to the speciﬁc elicitation method. The
degree of overconﬁdence depends on (a) whether
point estimates are made before stating the interval, as opposed to afterward (Juslin et al. 1999); (b)
whether DMs answer questions in two-point format
with only the boundary points or three-point format
with the boundary points along with the median estimate (Soll and Klayman 2004); or (c) which speciﬁc
prestated probability level (e.g., 50%, 70%, or 90% as
in this study) is given for the corresponding intervals
(values). And, of course, our results illustrate the differences between the direct and interval judgments.
Despite the presence of miscalibration in both methods, we showed that they are quite consistent with
each other and, in particular, that one can use estimates of the quantiles to infer quite accurately the
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judges’ direct probability judgments. This realization
has both theoretical and practical implications.
Miscalibration of probability judgments is attributed to systematic cognitive biases and/or the “noise”
(the stochastic component) associated with the judgment process (Budescu et al. 1997a, b; Erev et al.
1994; Juslin et al. 1999). Of course, these sources can
operate in different ways under the two methods.
Our results cannot rule out any source, nor can we
determine their relative contribution to overt overconﬁdence, but we can offer some speculations on
the nature of the problem. The most important conclusion stems from the observed agreement between
the two response modes and the possibility of using
the conﬁdence intervals to predict the judges’ direct
judgments. This result implies that in both methods
DMs rely on common covert subjective feelings of
conﬁdence inferred from the information available to
them, which are then converted into the overt numerical responses (Erev et al. 1994, Soll 1996) as required
by the methods. We cannot conclude that this common internal representation is accurate (well calibrated), but it makes good sense to assume that, if it
is biased, the nature, direction, and magnitude of the
bias is not method speciﬁc and it affects responses in
both methods in the same way. The most direct support for this conclusion is the similarity of the mean
values of the distributions inferred for the probability
judgments and the quantile estimates.
On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that
the error magnitude and effects are method speciﬁc
because of the different conditioning of the problem in the two tasks. When asked to judge probabilities, the DM conditions the judgments on given
values (i.e., judge F X given X) and responds on
the bounded 0 1 probability scale. When asked
to estimate quantiles, the DM conditions the judgments on ﬁxed probabilities (i.e., estimate X given
F X), and responds on an unbounded monetary scale
(price ≥ 0). It is well documented (Erev et al. 1994,
Budescu et al. 1997a) that in the ﬁrst case the errors
are regressive towards the mean (i.e., pulling the
judgments towards 0.5) because of the boundedness
of the scale. There is no reason to expect a similar pattern for quantile judgments but, unfortunately,
there are no (and we did not collect) data to quantify these distributions. We do have indirect support for this speculation in the different estimates of
variance obtained from the two tasks in the second
study. Future work should replicate our study but
should replicate (at least some of the) judgments to
allow for estimation of within-judge variance for both
methods.
Proper assessment of judgment quality is extremely
important in investment setting because investors
make critical decisions regarding future values of
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risky assets based on imperfect knowledge and
incomplete information. To make sound investment
decisions, investors must have a realistic view of the
quality of their information. The standard view in
the ﬁnance literature is that investors are overconﬁdent about their ability to evaluate securities and pick
stocks (Barber and Odean 2000; Daniel et al. 1998,
2001; De Bondt and Thaler 1995). Recent experimental
results challenged the generality of the overconﬁdence claim and questioned whether ﬁnancial models should assume overconﬁdence when predicting
investors’ behaviors, or whether they should be context speciﬁc (i.e., incorporate either over- or underconﬁdence depending on the response mode) to improve
their predictive validity. Financial researchers are
faced with the critical task of choosing a speciﬁc
method to elicit accurate conﬁdence judgments to
minimize the problems associated with miscalibration
and to extract valid information from the noisy data.
Thus, it is natural to ask which method(s) one
should use to obtain accurate and well-calibrated
probabilities regarding ﬁnancial items. Our recommendation is straightforward: We favor elicitation of
multiple quantiles that can be used to ﬁt a complete
distribution of the target quantity. This distribution
can be used (a) to predict probabilities of speciﬁc
binary events (e.g., various thresholds), (b) to improve
the quality of the target conﬁdence intervals (note that
in our study the three conﬁdence intervals inferred
from the ﬁtted distributions were more accurate than
those based on the judges’ raw estimates), and (c) to
infer conﬁdence intervals (e.g., 60%, 95%) that were
not elicited directly. We recognize that there are many
unanswered practical questions, such as how many,
and which, quantiles to estimate, what constrains to
impose on the ﬁtted distributions, and how to elicit
judgments to maximize the accuracy of the distribution. For example, Soll and Klayman (2004) suggested
that the precision of the distributions is improved if,
instead of judging X% conﬁdence intervals, judges are
asked to estimate its endpoints separately (i.e., the
100 − X/2 and the (100 + X/2 quantiles). We hope
that these issues will be addressed by future research.
Acknowledgments

This work was supported by grants from the U.S. National
Science Foundation under Awards NSF SES 02-41434 and
06-20008. The second author gratefully acknowledges the
ﬁnancial support of the Richard D. and Anne Marie Irwin
Foundation at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful
comments.

References
Alpert, M., H. Raiffa. 1982. A progress report on the training of
probability advisors. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky, eds.
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 294–305.

1744

Budescu and Du: Coherence and Consistency of Investors’ Probability Judgments

Barber, B., T. Odean. 2000. Trading is hazardous to your wealth:
The common stock investment performance of individual
investors. J. Finance 55 773–806.
Barber, B., T. Odean. 2002. Online investors: Do the slow die ﬁrst?
Rev. Financial Stud. 15 455–487.
Barberis, N., R. Thaler. 2003. A survey of behavioral ﬁnance.
G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, R. Stulz, eds. Handbook of
the Economics of Finance. Elsevier, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
1052–1090.
Brier, G. W. 1950. Veriﬁcation of forecasts expressed in terms of
probability. Monthly Weather Rev. 78 1–3.
Budescu, D. V., T. S. Wallsten, W. T. Au. 1997a. On the importance
of random error in the study of probability judgment. Part II:
Applying the stochastic judgment model to detect systematic
trends. J. Behav. Decision Making 10 172–188.
Budescu, D. V., I. Erev, T. S. Wallsten, J. F. Yates, eds. 1997b. Introduction to special issue: Stochastic and cognitive models of
conﬁdence. J. Behav. Decision Making 10 153–285.
Budescu, D. V., K. M. Kuhn, K. M. Kramer, T. Johnson. 2002. Modeling certainty equivalents for imprecise gambles. Organ. Behav.
Human Decision Processes 88 748–768.
Daniel, K. D., D. Hirshleifer, A. Subrahmanyam. 1998. Investor psychology and investor under- and overreactions. J. Finance 53
1839–1886.
Daniel, K. D., D. Hirshleifer, A. Subrahmanyam. 2001. Mispricing, covariance risk, and the cross section of security returns.
J. Finance 5 921–965.
De Bondt, W. F. M., R. Thaler. 1995. Financial decision making in
markets and ﬁrms: A behavioral perspective. R. A. Jarrow,
V. Maksimovic, W. T. Ziemba, eds. Finance, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol. 9, Chap. 13. NorthHolland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 385–410.
Du, N., D. V. Budescu. 2005. The effects of imprecise probabilities
and outcomes in evaluating investment options. Management
Sci. 51 1791–1803.
Edwards, W. 1968. Conservatism in human information processing.
B. Kleinmuntz, ed. Formal Representation of Human Judgment.
Wiley, New York, 17–52.
Erev, I., T. S. Wallsten, D. V. Budescu. 1994. Simultaneous overand underconﬁdence: The role of error in judgment processes.
Psych. Rev. 101 519–527.
Gigerenzer, G., U. Hoffrage, H. Kleinbolting. 1991. Probabilistic
mental models: A Brunswikian theory of conﬁdence. Psych.
Rev. 98 506–528.
Gilovich, T., D. Grifﬁn, D. Kahneman. 2002. Heuristics and Biases:
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
Glaser, M., T. Langer, M. Weber. 2003. On the trend recognition
and forecasting ability of professional traders. CEPR Discussion Paper 3904, Center for Economic Policy Research, London,
UK.
Hoch, S. J. 1985. Counterfactual reasoning and accuracy in predicting personal events. J. Experiment. Psych.: Learn., Memory,
Cognition 11 719–731.
Jørgensen, M., K. H. Teigen, K. Moløkken. 2004. Better sure than
safe? Overconﬁdence in judgment based software development
effort prediction intervals. J. Systems Software 70 79–93.
Juslin, P. 1993. An explanation of the hard-easy effect in studies
of realism of conﬁdence in one’s general knowledge. Eur. J.
Cognitive Psych. 5 55–71.
Juslin, P. 1994. The overconﬁdence phenomenon as a consequence
of informal experimenter guided selection of almanac items.
Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 57 226–246.
Juslin, P., P. Wennerholm, H. Olsson. 1999. Format-dependence in
subjective probability calibration. J. Experiment. Psych.: Learn.,
Memory, Cognition 25 1038–1052.

Management Science 53(11), pp. 1731–1744, © 2007 INFORMS

Juslin, P., A. Winman, H. Olsson. 2000. Naive empiricism and dogmatism in conﬁdence research: A critical examination of the
hard-easy effect. Psych. Rev. 10 384–396.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, A. Tversky. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Keren, G. 1991. Calibration and probability judgments: Conceptual
and methodological issues. Acta Psychologica 77 217–273.
Kirchler, E., B. Maciejovsky. 2002. Simultaneous over- and underconﬁdence: Evidence from experimental asset markets. J. Risk
Uncertainty 25 65–85.
Klayman, J. 1995. Varieties of conﬁrmation bias. J. Busemeyer,
R. Hastie, D. L. Medin, eds. Decision Making from a Cognitive
Perspective. Academic Press, New York, 365–418.
Klayman, J., J. Soll, C. Gonzalez-Vallejo, S. Barlas. 1999. Overconﬁdence: It depends on how, what, and whom you ask. Organ.
Behav. Human Decision Processes 79 216–247.
Koriat, A., S. Lichtenstein, B. Fischhoff. 1980. Reasons for conﬁdence. J. Experiment. Psych.: Human Learn. Memory 6 107–118.
Kuhn, K. M., D. V. Budescu. 1996. The relative importance of probabilities, outcomes, and vagueness in hazard risk decisions.
Organ. Behav. Human Decision Processes 68 301–317.
Lawrence, M., P. Goodwin, M. O’Connor, D. Önkal. 2006. Judgmental forecasting: A review of progress over the last 25 years.
Internat. J. Forecasting 22 493–518.
Lichtenstein, S., B. Fischhoff. 1977. Do those who know more also
know more about how much they know?: The calibration of
probability judgments. Organ. Behav. Human Performance 20
159–183.
Lichtenstein, S., B. Fischhoff, L. D. Phillips. 1982. Calibration
of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, A. Tversky, eds. Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
UK, 306–334.
Murphy, A. H. 1973. A new vector partition of the probability score.
J. Appl. Meteorology 12 595–600.
Rottenstreich, Y., A. Tversky. 1997. Unpacking, repacking, and
anchoring: Advances in support theory. Psych. Rev. 104 406–415.
Russo, J. E., P. J. H. Schoemaker. 1992. Managing overconﬁdence.
Sloan Management Rev. 33 7–17.
Seaver, D. A., D. V. Von Winterfeldt, W. Edwards. 1978. Eliciting
subjective probability distributions on continuous variables.
Organ. Behav. Human Performance 21 352–379.
Soll, J. B. 1996. Determinants of overconﬁdence and miscalibration: The roles of random error and ecological structure. Organ.
Behav. Human Decision Processes 65 117–137.
Soll, J. B., J. Klayman. 2004. Overconﬁdence in interval estimates.
J. Experiment. Psych.: Learn., Memory, Cognition 30 299–314.
Teigen, K. H., M. Jørgensen. 2005. When 90% conﬁdence intervals
are 50% certain: On the credibility of credible intervals. Appl.
Cognitive Psych. 19 455–475.
Tversky, A., D. Kahneman. 1974. Judgments under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. Science 185 1124–1131.
Von Winterfeldt, D., W. Edwards. 1986. Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Winman, A., P. Hansson, P. Juslin. 2004. Subjective probability intervals: How to reduce overconﬁdence by interval evaluation.
J. Experiment. Psych.: Learn., Memory Cognition 30 1167–1175.
Yaniv, I., D. P. Foster. 1995. Graininess of judgment under uncertainty: An accuracy- informativeness trade-off. J. Experiment.
Psych.: General 124 424–432.
Yaniv, I., D. P. Foster. 1997. Precision and accuracy of judgmental
estimation. J. Behavioral Decision Making 10 21–32.
Yates, J. F. 1982. External correspondence: Decomposition of the
mean probability score. Organ. Behav. Human Performance 30
132–156.
Yates, J. F. 1990. Judgment and Decision Making. Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

